Being and Time – Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Being and Time – Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.  There’s so much here that’s hard to compress into a succinct account.

” our aim in the following treatise is to work out the question of the sense of being and to do so concretely” which must mean ‘materially’, as he goes on to talk about “the being to whom being matters“.  “[W]hat is the being that will give access to the question of the meaning of Being? Heidegger’s answer is that it can only be that being for whom the question of Being is important, the being for whom Being matters.  As this answer already indicates, the being for whom Being is a question is not a what, but a who. Heidegger calls this being Dasein (an ordinary German word meaning, roughly, “(human) existence” or, more literally, “being-there”).”  ‘Heidegger’s account of Dasein passes through a dissection of the experiences of Angst and mortality, and then through an analysis of the structure of “care” as such.  [‘Care’ seems likely to have the same meaning as ‘matter’ above, ie ‘is important to’.]  From there he raises the problem of “authenticity,” that is, the potentiality or otherwise for mortal Dasein to exist fully enough that it might actually understand being.  Heidegger is clear throughout the book that nothing makes certain that Dasein is capable of this understanding.’

“If we grasp Being, we will clarify the meaning of being, or “sense” of being (“Sinn des Seins”)”; [here] by “sense” Heidegger means that “in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something”.  While I doubt the idea of  intelligibility as an idea, insofar as the word means only ‘reading into’ and/or ‘choosing between’ (‘inter‘ + ‘legere’), it could be taken to mean here precisely that ‘reading into’ constitutes (quite literally) what I have previously called ’emerging middles’, entities emerging to experience by/in examining existing existential experience of experienced extant entities (so constitutes experimental empiricism).

For the same reasons, ie, that I regard apparently new entities of understanding as emerging middles, I also doubt the idea of progressivism: ‘Heidegger argues that a true understanding of being can proceed only by referring to particular beings, and that the best method of pursuing being must inevitably, he says, involve a kind of hermeneutic circle, that is (as he explains in his critique of prior work in the field of hermeneutics), it must rely upon repetitive yet progressive acts of interpretation. “The methodological sense of phenomenological description is interpretation.” ‘ It seems to me that all that happens under examination of experience is that details are elicited and elucidated so come to light, that enable a fuller sense of completion and completeness of account of the experience, entraining a more fulfilling sense of empathy, a resonance.  This may be what Heidegger means by ‘authenticity’.

Loads more to say on this, yet other posts to make now.  For leaflittering, my ‘verity/vertue/truth to oneself’ blog, want to reflect on my imperative for integration of vertue, view and vision, relative to ‘authenticity’ of phenomenology and existentialism, and for leaflottering, my ‘vision of the good life’ blog, want to review the real possibility of ethics emerging out of empathy, itself emerging out of examined experience of experience and/as existence ‘understanding preceding any other way of knowing’, as Heidegger put it.

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About leaflittering

person thinking about life as a series of encounters between expectations and experiences, and applying ideas to ecology, ethics, epistemology, and education in various environments
This entry was posted in emergence, evolution, experience, theories and stories. Bookmark the permalink.

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