- Home | Being Wrong
- The Hindu : Opinion / Interview : ‘I would define politics as the composition of a common world’
- The Bad Mother Manifesto – Her Bad Mother
- Cambridge Journals Online – Behavioral and Brain Sciences Vol. 25 Iss. 01
- Cambridge Journals Online – Behavioral and Brain Sciences Vol. 25 Iss. 01
Mr WordPress on Hello world!
Speculative Realism as “philosophy fiction” | Beyond The Beyond. Non-common sense reality, neither shifty idealist correlationism, nor stuffy realist concretism, ‘generating modes of reality that are notably weird’. Still worried about the weird – to whom is it weird? The ‘not common sense’ seems right, if it means ‘not conventional’ rather than ‘not common’. All sense, is common, within and among species. Someone wrote about interpenetration (think it was in/about the sampling, causation and algorith post, will find link later).
ARCADE: Literature, the Humanities, and the World. Posted a comment here, which tooks loads of courage to risk being wrong in so public a place (voices heard cautioning ‘don’t display your ignorance). Yet nothing ventured…
on Grant’s response in The Speculative Turn « Object-Oriented Philosophy. Fascinating post by Graham Harman on Iain Hamilton Grant’s response to his article on substance. One/multiple substance (GB, GH), or one productive force, one – ‘anteriority’ – (IHG) which sounds like deep structure. Find myself wanting to say, No, no, no, no matter how far you question it, it is still great white elephants all the way down. (Cf Sheldon Kopp, If You Meet the Buddha…)
Have found in a Baptist sermon a reference for the elephants to William James. The sermon is actually rather good, except for the privileging of ‘full’ human awareness to preclude all other forms of awareness of which human awareness de facto may not be aware, which inescapable unawareness of those forms does not allow or excuse denial or dismissal.
Graham Harman writes “Grant thinks that there is a productive force that turns into individuals only when it meets with “retardations.” But either the productive force is a single lump, or it has multiple regions. [..] There is no “third way” between these extremes, often though it has been tried.” For me this evokes and invokes the photon-photonde problem/phase change, which seems to me to allow of a basic (albeit perhaps place-holdingly equivocal) position of ‘phot’ or ‘photo’.
The problem here as for ecology in general is of changes: fi, when and how does one species (as a specific set of specific characters of specified sorts) become another, ie, by what material means does it happen and by what metaphysical modes is it recognised to have happened.
‘Conatus’, explained here, posits a sort of will to continue to exist (conatus is from conari, to try). Again a Procrustean reification, naturalisation and normalisation of an inherited artefact of our anthropocentric cultural history. Entities emerge, exist, extinguish, in our experience. Volition, as free will and free won’t, is under challenge in cognitive and neuroopsychology, with various models of motor-motive positing somatic-body response as primary and probably prior, immediate under metabolic impetus that produces morphic imperative, with mental interpretation of motives sequential or at best simultaneous, thus obviating rational calculation, and in some accounts, rational consciousness.
At present I don’t know how the ooo people justify privilege of anthropic experience of any sort as giving any sort of window on any reality other than the reality for us for our particular purposes of our experience. To posit any reality to which humans can have access by whatever artefacts and apparatuses that always ultimately employ human experience, seems completely paradoxical (= parallaxical). I keep looking for some account of their epistemology that doesn’t like all other metaphysics rest on their being ‘great white elephants all the way down’ (see ref above).
Perhaps Harman’s last line indicates the epistemology: “Every object has a genetic history, sure, but not all aspects of that history are preserved; besides which, that history is one of the conjunction and disjunction of other objects, not of a “productive anteriority.” ” This is exactly how it seems to me: existence is/as experience of extant/emergent/extinct entities, with contingent contiguities constituting continuities of several sorts that pervade, perpetrate and perpetuate identity, with whatever competences and consequences in/for/as/with/by resonances as empathic experiences/effects for simultaneous and contemporaneous but not necessarily coextensive or coterminous entities of experience.
Politics of Survival | Planomenology. Find myself in huge disagreement with the pan-naturalisation and -normalisation of the supposed ‘struggle for survival’. The perception that such a struggle exists and persists across zoe is an ongoing outcome of our Western Graeco-Judaeo-Christian heritage. As far as I can see, it’s a teleological interpretation of a tautological intendency-as-imperative, operating in all immediacies under its existing impetuses. Everything is alive until it’s dead, and so continues to do the things that its life habitually consists in until it can’t. As per headless chickens. This iteration of life habits until death intervenes has been misinterpreted as evidence of ‘the struggle for existence’. This is our story as entities facing existential angst of entities facing existential angst. We humans tell ourselves stories about life and death in their experienced unpredictability simply because that’s what we do to pass the time. Meanwhile our bodies keep on metabolising until they can’t. The argument about the value of life to animals, and how humans have to plead for them applies only in a world that seems to humans to be dominated by humans. That’s just our human experience. It cannot be extrapolated to any other species and should not be privileged except in equalitarianism, which entrains and entails behaving with integrity as humans for humans. Virtue (goodness) ethics, combined with viability (utility) and value (duty) ethics, are for us to follow to be ourselves for ourselves. A common experience of existence, that might be called ’empathy’ or ‘resonance’, characterises all energetic-and-elemental entities across scales and scopes, as that’s what existence is, experience. Humans in their human experience recognise, as in Hinduism and Buddhism and Taoism, a common substance/essence of existence, that all life as existence passes through, pattern-process, particle-procession, ont-onde, existence-as-experience all there is, entities emerging to experience and extinguishing as/in that experience, as/to the experiencer. All entities discussed in the article are artefacts of human experience of existence. Yes, humans then must decide how best to be human with their species- and culture-specific experience, that of course includes the artefacts of examination of that experience, as discussion/discussed here. Since according to our stories we are ephemeral, our empathy of and with our own experience of our empathy with other species and cultures enforms (sic) all our actions. Evolution e-volv-ing, emergence e-merg-ing, existence ex-ist-ing, and extinction ex-tinct-ing. Empathy in/as ecological existence is/as justice.
Dissent Over Descent: Intelligent Design’s Challenge to Darwinism: Amazon.co.uk: Steve Fuller: Books
Dissent Over Descent: Intelligent Design’s Challenge to Darwinism: Amazon.co.uk: Steve Fuller: Books. Here’s the arrow of time ref, p3 of the introduction. Having read some of this, am still not clear whether Steve Fuller is defending and explaining or exposing for examination the ID hypothesis.
Signature in the Cell: DNA and the Evidence for Intelligent Design: Amazon.co.uk: Stephen Meyer: Books
Signature in the Cell: DNA and the Evidence for Intelligent Design: Amazon.co.uk: Stephen Meyer: Books. This is Meyer on ID. No arrow of time ref here, but much other teleonomy. How in the light of this any philosopher could have objected to my asserting that many scientists overtly subscribed to the anthropic principle beats me.